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COMMENTARIES

REFINED INCORPORATION AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Richard L. Aynes*
In Professor Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of Rights: Creation
and Reconstruction,' the voices of Founders, Federalists, AntiFederalists, promoters of the Bill of Rights, contrarians of
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,2 abolitionists, antislavery advocates, Fourteenth Amendment Republican Framers, ratifiers,
and twentieth-century U.S. Supreme Court justices, all have
their role. If they do not sing the same tune, at least their
voices, under Amar's skillful direction, whether melody or harmony, alto or soprano, all harmonize to produce a clear song.
Though there are important and critical verses surrounding
the Founding Era, it is the transformative era of Reconstruction
in which Professor Amar seeks to write a new stanza. The
centerpiece of this new work is his doctrine of "refined incorporation," which holds that personal rights contained in the Bill
of Rights are privileges and immunities within the meaning of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The purpose of this
essay is to examine the refined incorporation doctrine and test
it against the historic roots of the Fourteenth Amendment.

* Dean, Professor of Law, and Constitutional Law Center Research Fellow, The
University of Akron School of Law.
1. AKHIL REED MAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
2. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
3. See ALR, supra note 1, at 215-30.
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I. PAST GRIEVANCES AND FUTURE HOPES

One of the many methods of interpreting an action-be it a
statute or a constitutional amendment-is to look at the
grievances that gave rise to that action. In general, the
grievances that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment began with
the concepts of the "Slave Power" and the "Slave Power Conspiracy."4 The feeling was that the national government had
been captured by an elite group of oligarchs, the slaveholders.5
The slaveholders used the government itself to perpetuate not
only slavery, but their own power as well.6
Statistics show that slaveholders were disproportionately
represented in the national government. For example, southern
slaveholders held the presidency for forty-nine of the seventytwo years between the ratification of the Constitution and
1861.' Twenty-three of the thirty-six speakers of the House of
Representatives and twenty-four of the thirty-six President Pro
Tems of the Senate were Southerners.' Of the thirty-five men
who served on the U.S. Supreme Court, twenty were from the
South.'
Had these results been produced through what were perceived as open, fair, and democratic elections, the antislavery
forces might have viewed themselves as a permanent minority.
They, however, saw these results as a product of unfair and
antidemocratic practices, some of which they perceived as
stemming from the Constitution itself. The requirement that
the U.S. Senate have two senators from each state gave southern slave states disproportional representation in the Senate.1"
4. See generally DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1969); HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE

POWER IN AMERICA (1872); Larry Gara, Slavery and the Slave Power: A Crucial Distinction, 15 CIv. WAR HisT. 5 (1969).
5. See ANDREW W. CRANDALL, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

76-78 (1930).
6. See Gara, supra note 4, at 5-6.
7. See JAMES MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 12-13 (1991).

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.1. Even though the 1860 population of the 20
northern states was more than twice that of the free population of the 14 slave
states, the slave states held 28 of the 68 Senate seats. See THE CIVIL WAR 78-79
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The fact that, under the Three-Fifths Clause, people held in
slavery counted towards a state's representation in the House of
Representatives meant that slave states had disproportional
representation in the House as well." Likewise, it meant that
voters in slaveholding states had more influence than voters in
nonslaveholding states. The Electoral College, based on these
same "defects," produced a similar distortion that tilted the
playing field in favor of proslavery advocates. 2
Nevertheless, the abolitionists and antislavery forces had an
optimism in the power of free speech and persuasion that led
them to believe that Slave Power could be defeated at the ballot box in an otherwise fair fight. In an evangelical age, they
believed that God's truth-that all people were made of one
blood-would ultimately prevail if given a fair chance.'3
When one looks at the history of the actions taken to protect
slavery, however, one quickly sees that such a fair chance did
not exist. To paint in broad strokes, we know that freedom of
speech on the question of slavery was denied in the
slaveholding states.'4 The right to petition was denied by the
"gag" rule in the Congress. 5 Freedom of press was denied in
slaveholding states and in some northern states as well. 6
Even the right to speak one's mind on the floor of the U.S.
Senate was shown to be illusory when Charles Sumner was
brutally attacked by Representative Preston Brooks and caned

(Richard M. Ketchum ed., 1968). This was roughly eight more seats than the South
would have had under a strict representative population basis.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.3.
12. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. For example, without the benefit of counting slaves
as three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportioning the House of Representatives
and through it, the Electoral College, John Adams would have been reelected in 1800
over Thomas Jefferson. See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the PeculiarInstitution
in American Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1993).
13. See Acts 17:26.
14. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 237-42; see also CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOMOF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE TO THE OLD SOUTH (1940); RUSSEL BLAINE NYE, FETTERED
FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1972).

15. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 848-49 (1995).
16. See id.; Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an AntiAbolition Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of
American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1109 (1997).
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in the well of the Senate." That incident was only the most
dramatic of a series in which Southerners with guns, knives,
and intimidating words attempted to silence the speech of
northern representatives. 8 Antislavery meetings were broken
up, denying the right of free assembly. 9
Antislavery grievances, however, went well beyond denial of
First Amendment rights. We know that under the postwar
black codes, state militia made up of former Confederate soldiers took away the arms that the U.S. Army had given to
black Union veterans for their faithful service.20 The effort of
people, whom the North viewed as traitors, to disarm loyalists
sparked concerns about the Second Amendment right to bear
arms. 2 1

Fourth Amendment concerns were evident as well. The controversy during President Jackson's administration over the
Postmaster General's refusal to ship pamphlets making antislavery arguments through the mail raised significant Fourth
Amendment issues across the nation.22 The slaveholders alleged "right" to enter the cabins of people held in slavery pro17. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, AMERICA IN 1857: A NATION ON THE BRINK 11
(1990).
18. One interesting change in the dynamic of Congress took place when "western"
men entered the Congress. All talk of challenging Ohio Senator Ben Wade disappeared when Wade, upon entering the Senate the day after a threatened challenge,
displayed two large pistols which he took from underneath his coat and placed in his
Senate desks. See LINus P. BROcKETr, MEN OF OUR DAY 245-46 n.* (1868).
Similarly, because of Ohio Congressman Lewis Campbell's role in the attempted
expulsion of Preston Brooks from the House after Brooks's attack upon Charles
Sumner, Southerners were determined to challenge Campbell to a duel. When Campbell heard of the impending challenge, he went to a public shooting gallery and
snuffed out a candle by shooting at the flame with a rifle three times in a row. All
talk of challenging Campbell ceased. See James E. Campbell, Sumner-BrooksBurlingame, or, The Last of the Great Challenges, 34 0. ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q.
435, 455 (1925).
Representative Brooks did challenge Massachusetts Representative Anson
Burlingame to a duel. Burlingame was described as "a bitter foe of slavery, a fine
rifle shot and . . 'a northern man who would fight." Id. at 455-56. Burlingame
accepted the challenge and set Canada as the place for the duel. Brooks rather lamely claimed he could not safely reach Canada and no duel was fought. See id. at 46063.
19. See generally sources cited supra note 16.
20. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 50-59.
21. See id. at 264-65.
22. See W. SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE 1830-1860 (1968).
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duced an indignity in the North where people clung to Lord
Chatham's vision of a home as a private sanctum, which even
the government could not enter.'
The Fifth Amendment right to due process of law loomed
large in all of the antislavery arguments. Significant arguments, though outside of the mainstream discourse, suggested
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibited the
holding of slaves in any federal territory or in the District of
Columbia.' Moreover, mainstream antislavery constitutional
arguments suggested that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was
unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment Due
Process ClauseY Equally implicated were the Sixth and Seventh Amendment Jury Clauses because the Fugitive Slave Act
denied alleged fugitives a trial by jury.26 Slave owners and
slave states often inflicted what were seen as inhuman and
intolerable punishments upon slaves, invoking images of the
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.'
Thus, the very context of the times in which the onset of the
Civil War came brought about disputes over the original Bill of
Rights. People claimed that those rights applied to the states
based upon a variety of theories. Some claimed they were natural rights, which the Bill of Rights had properly protected as
well.' Some claimed protection for those rights under state
constitutions.'. Some claimed, protection for those rights
through the theory of what Professor Amar has called the
Barron contrarians: the view that Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore30 was wrongly decided and that the Bill of Rights applied
directly to the states.3 Others claimed that the rights under
23. "[Tlhe poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
crown." United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 151 (D.C.E.D. Wisc.
1875) (No. 16,515).
24. See JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 45, 47 (1965).
25. See DONALD G. NEIMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP, AFRICAN AhiERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 17 (1991).

26. See id.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28. Under this theory, the Bill of Rights were declaratory of natural rights. See
AIAR, supra note 1, at 148-56.
29. See e.g., Virginia Bill of Rights in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 311-12 (Richard
L. Perry ed., 1978); OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. I (Ohio Bill of Rights).
30. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
31. See A&AR,supra note 1, at 145-62.
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the Bill of Rights were included in the privileges and immunities protections provided for federal citizens through Article IV,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.2
Whatever the legal theory, it seems clear that significant
groups of people, including key government officials, thought
that the same rights protected by the Bill of Rights ought to be,
and perhaps were, protected by the federal government against
the states. Undoubtedly, people did not think clearly and carefully about the intricacies of the general principle. Which theory
was the "correct" theory? Would every single provision or clause
of the Bill of Rights apply? Would enforcement take place by
the legislature or by the judiciary? To deny, however, that
widespread groups of people had fully worked out all of the
details is not to deny that they had accepted the general principle.
Coupled with these references, we have numerous and uncontradicted statements in the Congress indicating that one of the
results of the Fourteenth Amendment was that all citizens
could claim the protections of the first eight amendments
against the states. 3 Professor Amar's excellent synthesis of the

32. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 66-74 (1993).
33. At this point, I want to make a distinction about the language we use. The
word "incorporation" (meaning to incorporate the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment) is not the word choice of the nineteenth-century participants in
the drafting and ratification of the Amendment. Professor Amar does not quote from
any speech in which a participant in the process used that word and I do not recall
any time in which that word was used in the 1866-1868 debates. The word does not
appear in what is generally the very helpful index to the key debates prepared by
Alfred Avins. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 745-53 (Alfred Avins

ed., 1967). Though I have not attempted to trace its genealogy, an early use of the
term appears in Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter was hostile not only to incorporation but to the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. In 1924, he argued for the repeal of the Due Process Clause and
was critical of the Equal Protection Clause. See Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman,
Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 121718 (1995). In 1928, he referred to the Reconstruction amendments as "drastic" limitations on the states. See id. By 1954, Frankfurter "wished" that the Fourteenth
Amendment had never been adopted. See id. This should give one pause in utilizing
the terminology of one who was not himself friendly to the end result.
Whether more nuanced or more ambiguous, Justice Hugo Black chose significantly different language to characterize his theory. In his own words, the legislative
history "conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the Four-
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debates adds to Justice Hugo Black's pathbreaking dissent in
Adamson v. California,' W.W. Crosskey's empathetic reading
of the Congressional debates,' 5 the work of Alfred Avins,"
Michael Curtis's numerous articles and important book, " and
the writings of countless others. Without recounting those efforts line by line, it is fair to say that on the floor of Congress
there were specific references by important Republican proponents of the Amendment suggesting that, no matter what the
theory, after the adoption of the Amendment, it would enforce
against the state the following constitutional provisions:
First Amendment:'

free speech, 9 freedom of press,4 ° right

teenth Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought ... sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections
of the Bill of Rights." Adamson, 332 U.S. at 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). While Justice Black may have merely meant to suggest that his view was
supported by both the Due Process Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the language he chose, unlike Justice Frankfurter's doctrine of incorporation, is more
consistent with the historical record. The language accommodates the majority view of
the 39th Congress that the Bill of Rights was already binding on the states through
the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. See Aynes, supra note 32, at 70-74, 79-80. The language also accommodates
John Bingham's minority view that while the Bill of Rights was morally binding on
the states, the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary in order to allow the federal
government to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. See id. Thus, while I will
adhere to the convention of referring to theories identified as incorporation, selective
incorporation, incorporation plus, and refined incorporation, I do not find the word
"incorporation" to be a particularly apt one in discussing the enforcement of the Bill
of Rights against the states.
34. 332 U.S. at 68-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. See William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1954).
36. See Alfred Avins, Incorporations of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman
Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1969).
37. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDAMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
38. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
39. See Honorable John A.- Bingham, Speech at Belpre, Ohio (Sept. 14, 1871), in
CADIZ REPUBLICAN, Sept. 28, 1871, at 1 [hereinafter Bingham, Speech at Belpre,
Ohio]; see also AMlAR, supra note 1, at 184 n.*; id. at 192 (statement of Rep.
Moulton); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
[hereinafter Howard]; George W. Paschal, Lecture Delivered to the American Union
Academy of Literature, Science, and Art, at its Special Meeting Called for the Purpose (Mar. 7, 1870), in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, DEFINED AND
CAREFULLY ANNOTATED at xliv (1876).
40. See Bingham, Speech at Belpre, Ohio, supra note 39, at 1; see also AMAR,
supra note 1, at 182; id. at 192 (statement of Rep. Moulton); Paschal, supra note 39,
at xli.
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to petition,4 right to assembly and petition,4 2 Free Exercise
Clause' and Establishment Clause;"
45
Second Amendment: right to bear arms;
4
Third Amendment: no quartering of troops; 1

Fourth Amendment: right against unreasonable search and
seizures;4 7
Due Process Clause," and Just CompenFifth Amendment:
49
Clause;
sation
Sixth Amendment: notice" and trial by jury;5
Seventh Amendment: civil jury trial;5 2 and
Eighth Amendment: proportionality in cruel and unusual
punishment5 3 and no excessive bail.'

41. See Paschal, supra note 39, at xli.
42. See Howard, supra note 39.
43. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 184 n.* (statement of Rep. John Bingham); id. at
192 (statement of Rep. Hart); Bingham, Speech at Belpre, Ohio, supra note 39, at 1;
see also Paschal, supra note 39, at xli.
44. See Paschal, supra note 39, at xli.
45. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 192 (statement of Rep. Hart); id. at 192-93 (statement of Rep. Clarke); Howard, supra note 39; Bingham, Speech at Belpre, Ohio, supra note 39.
46. See Howard, supra note 39.
47. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 192 (statement of Rep. Hart); Howard, supra note
39; Paschal, supra note 39, at xli.
48. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1866) (statement of Rep. Garfield); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862) (statement of Rep. Bingham);
see also AAR, supra note 1, at 182, 184 n.* (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 192
(statement of Rep. Hart); id. (statement of Rep. Moulton); Paschal, supra note 39, at
xli.
49. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866) (would overrule
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)); see also AMAR, supra note
1, at 182, 184 n.*.
50. See Howard, supra note 39.
51. See Howard, supra note 39; Bingham, Speech at Belpre, Ohio, supra note 39,
at 1; Paschal, supra note 39, at xli.
52. See Howard, supra note 39; Bingham, Speech at Belpre, Ohio, supra note 39,
at 1; see also AMAR, supra note 1, at 182.
53. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2542 (1866); Howard, supra note 39; see also AMAR, supra note 1, at 183-84
n.*.

54. See Howard, supra note 39.
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In addition to these references to most of the provisions of
the first eight amendments, Congressman Bingham's 1871
speech recounting the history of the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its purpose indicated that the privileges and
immunities were "chiefly defined" by the first eight amendments.5 Without any suggestion that some portions of the
amendments would be enforceable against the states and other
portions would not, Bingham proceeded to quote, verbatim, each
and every provision of the first eight amendments.'
Thus, we can couple the noncongressional concerns about a
variety of provisions from the Bill of Rights with the congressionally expressed concerns to build a strong linkage between
the results hoped for by the Amendment and the rights protected by the Bill of Rights."
When we look to legislative history in Congress, we frequently look to the key advocates of the provision. Ohio Congressman
John A. Bingham and Michigan Senator Jacob Howard were
the key advocates for the Fourteenth Amendment. Bingham
was a lawyer, county prosecutor, member of the Judge Advocate
General's staff, Solicitor of the U.S. Court of Claims, frequent
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, and member of the
important Joint Committee on Reconstruction.58 Additionally,
Bingham authored all of Section 1," except the Citizenship
Clause, and led the fight for adoption of the Amendment in the
Joint Committee and in the House.
Howard also was a lawyer and served as the Attorney General of Michigan.60 He, too, was on the Joint Committee and was
55. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871).
56. Id.
57. I set to one side the question of whether the theory used by the Framers to
achieve their intended result is important. There appear to be some who suggest that

if the Framers articulated a clear result based upon what is thought to be a false
theory, then both the result and the theory fail. See, e.g., Trish Olson, The Natural
Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

48 Aim L. REv. 347, 350 (1995). That is an important issue that is beyond the scope
of this article. I submit, however, perhaps somewhat tentatively, that if the intent to
accomplish a goal is clear, we cannot defeat that intent because we think the reasoning that led them to form the intent was faulty.
58. See Richard L. Aynes, John A. Bingham, in AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY

(John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
59. See AMAP, supra note 1, at 171.
60. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES' 759 (Alfred Avins ed., 2d
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chosen by the Chairman to be the spokesman for the Committee in the U.S. Senate.61
Bingham, of course, frequently spoke of enforcing the Bill of
Rights against the states without defining what he meant by
the Bill of Rights. 2 Other key leaders of Congress, such as
House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Wilson and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Lyman Trumbull, believed
that Congress already had the power to enforce the Bill of
Rights against the states.' As set forth above, Bingham frequently made references to most of the first eight amendments,
which is entirely consistent with his 1871 exposition indicating
that he meant to include only the first eight amendments as
the Bill of Rights.
These views were not hidden from the public. They were
reported in the Congressional Globe at a time when it was
nationally read by those interested in Congress and frequently
reprinted in local newspapers. Further, the New York Times's
summary of Bingham's February 28, 1866 speech told the reading public that this was "a proposition to arm the Congress ...
with power to enforce the Bill of Rights as it stood."" Similarly, Howard's speech introducing the Amendment to the Senate
and referring to it as enforcing the first eight amendments to
the U.S. Constitution also was published in the New York

ed. 1974).
61. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 187.
62. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-90 (1866). Bingham stated that
the Fourteenth Amendment would "arm the Congress . . . with the power to enforce
the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today." Id. at 1088. Bingham also
suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment would overcome the effects of Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (involving a question of whether the
Fifth Amendment is binding upon the states), and Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 469 (1833) (involving a question of whether the Seventh Amendment extends to
the states), which both generally state that the Bill of Rights was not enforceable
against the states. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866). The pamphlet version of this speech was, as Professor Amar emphasizes, "subtitled [a speech]
'insupport of the proposed amendment to enforce the bill of rights.'" AMAR, supra
note 1, at 187 (footnote omitted); see Aynes, supra note 32, at 72; see also CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (stating that the inability to "enforce the
bill of rights is the want of the Republic" and that Bingham wanted the Bill of
Rights enforced "everywhere").
63. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603-05 (1866); see also CURTIS, supra
note 37, at 80-84; Crosskey, supra note 35, at 16-17.
64. AMAR, supra note 1, at 187.
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Times' 5 and the New York Herald.' Further, the only three
treatise authors writing during the ratification period, from
1866 to 1868, who spoke directly to the meaning of the Amendment, indicated that it would result in enforcing the Bill of
Rights against the states.'
These threads of history, the evil that prompted the Amendment, the plain meaning of the words of the constitutional
Amendment, the legislative history of the Amendment, and the
interpretation of the Amendment by constitutional law treatise
authors, all converge to support the general conclusion that
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment a citizen
should be able to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states.e
This conclusion was, of course, the position advocated by
69
Justice Hugo Black in his dissent in Adamson v. California.
With three other justices joining his position, this view was just
one vote shy of being recognized as the law of the land. Nevertheless, in later days the Court embarked upon the process of
using the doctrine of "selective incorporation" to allow the enforcement against the states of some, but not all, of the first

65. See CURTIS, supra note 37, at 128 (citing N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1, col.

6).
66. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 187.
67. Those writers were of different political backgrounds and, like the members of
Congress, reached their conclusions from different routes. Yet they all reached the
same conclusion. Judge Timothy Farrar, a radical abolitionist and one-time law partner of Daniel Webster, published Manual of the Constitution of the United States in
1867. See Aynes, supra note 32, at 83-85 (citing TMIOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1867)). Former Arkansas Supreme Court Justice George W. Paschal was a proslavery Unionist from Texas and later became a
member of the law faculty of Georgetown University. See id. at 88. His treatise was
The Constitution of the United States Defined and Carefully Annotated. See id. at 85
(citing GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1868)). Un-

like Bingham, Paschal spoke of enforcing the thirteen amendments to the Constitution, necessarily including the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. See id. at 86. The last
treatise was written by John Norton Pomeroy, Dean of the Law School and Griswold
Professor of Political Science at the University of New York. See id. at 89. His treatise was entitled An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States. See
id. (citing JOHN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1868)). Pomeroy wrote of enforcing the first eight amendments. See
generally id. The text of what these writers said and information about their prominence is set forth in Aynes, supra note 32, at 83-94.
68. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 7.
69. See 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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eight amendments. Yet, with the onward march of the "selective" enforcement of the Bill of Rights, the Court came to apply
all elements of the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment,
the Fifth Amendment, with the exception of the grand jury
provisions, all aspects of the Sixth Amendment, and aspects of
the Eighth Amendment, against the states.70 Though not
strictly accurate, one can certainly understand Elizabeth Black's
point of view that, upon the application of the Confrontation
Clause to the states in Pointer v. Texas,7' her husband's dissent in Adamson had "the virtue of becoming the law.""
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ENFORCEMENT AND REFINED
INCORPORATION

Like Gaul, incorporation was historically divided into three
parts: Justice Black's total incorporation, Justice Frankfurter's
no incorporation, but sometimes reaching the same result
through "fundamental fairness and ordered liberty," and Justice
William Brennan's "selective incorporation." 3 In a skillful synthesis, Professor Amar posits that "there is something to be
said for each of three positions, but each is also fatally
flawed." 4 In his own words: "An alloy of the three seemingly
incompatible elements-an alloy that I shall call 'refined
incorporation'--will prove far more attractive and durable than
75
each unalloyed component."

70. See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
339-63 (1999) (discussing the Bill of Rights and selective incorporation).
71. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

LAW

72. HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MIL JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE
MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 109 (1986).
73. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 139. Justice Murphy and Justice Rutledge argued

that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment were not limited to those
contained in the Bill of Rights. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 123 (Murphy and Rutledge,
J.J., dissenting). This view is often referred to as "incorporation plus." The characterization of Justice Brennan's views are filled with tension. On the one hand,
Brennan is said to have "never met a right in the Bill [he] didn't like or deem fundamental enough to warrant incorporation," implying that given the opportunity
Brennan would have incorporated the entire Bill of Rights. AMAR, supra note 1, at
220. Yet on the next page, reference is made to "Brennan's intuition that perhaps not

every provision of the first eight amendments sensibly incorporates." Id. at 221.
74. AMAR, supra note 1, at 140.
75. Id.
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Amar's argument for refined incorporation has as its cornerstone the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause includes ("incorporates") as one of its
privileges or immunities, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus." He notes the reference to this right in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution and assumes that this Clause is the
source of the right. Because there is much in the literature
indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment Framers valued
habeas corpus, Professor Amar concludes that the Fourteenth
Amendment Framers "incorporated" the writ of habeas corpus
from Article I, Section 9.'
Having laid this foundation, Professor Amar builds upon it by
asking this question: "Why does the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporate [the Habeas Clause of Article I Section 9], but
not .. its section 9 companion [the Capitation] clause . . T

His answer is that the distinction is between the rights of citizens and the rights of states and the difference between clauses
that give individual rights to people and clauses that help
structure a federal government.79 Thus, refined incorporation is
"far more subtle" than Justice Black's incorporation because it
calls for the examination of each clause of the amendments
and, perhaps the original Constitution, to test whether the
clause is more like a federalism clause, no incorporation, or an
individual right, incorporation.' This is work, in Professor
Amar's words, for "a scalpel, not a meat cleaver.""' Under this
"new synthesis" one must "ask whether it is a personal privilege-that is, a private right-of individual citizens, rather than
a right of states or the public at large."'

76. See id. at 175.
77. See id. at 179-80.
78. Id. The Capitation Clause reads: "No Capitation, or other direct Tax shall be
laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be
taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
4.
79. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 180. This theme is built upon in Chapter 10, Refining Incorporation, beginning at page 219 and especially at page 221. The distinction between the Habeas Suspension Clause and the Capitation Clause is the constant example advanced to prove the point of refined incorporation. See generally id.
at 215-30.
80. See id. at 175-80.
81. Id. at 180.
82. Id. at 221.
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At one level, Professor Amar's suggestion that the privileges
and immunities of U.S. citizenship include matters outside the
first eight amendments is firmly grounded in legislative history.
Senator Jacob Howard's contemporary construction was explicit
on that point. After exploring the nature of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and quoting extensively from Justice Bushrod Washington's opinion in Corfield v.
Coryell,8 Howard continued,
[s]uch is the character of the privileges and immunities
spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution. To these privileges and immunities, whatever
they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully defined
in their entire extent and precise nature-to these should be
added the personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution. ....
John Bingham's 1871 speech on the drafting of the Amendment
indicated that the privileges and immunities were "chiefly"
contained in the Bill of Rights, clearly indicating that some of
the privileges and immunities were not contained in the first
eight amendments.'
Thus, we know that the author of the Amendment in the
House and the floor manager in the Senate both indicated that
privileges and immunities would go beyond the first eight
amendments. From Senator Howard, we also see an explicit
statement that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause would consist of the combination of all the
privileges and immunities under Article IV, Section 2 and the
first eight amendments.86 This view is consistent with the majority of Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866
based upon the belief that Congress already had the power to
enforce Article IV, Section 2 against the states.' This view is

83. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (emphasis added).
85. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871).
86. I admit there is an ambiguity here. Senator Howard refers to "the personal
rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments." CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Is he saying that the rights secured by the first
eight amendments are all personal rights or is he saying that only the "personal
rights" in the first eight amendments are privileges and immunities?
87. See Aynes, supra note 32, at 72-73.
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also consistent with John Bingham's minority view that what
was lacking was the power to enforce Article IV, Section 2
against the states and that the Fourteenth Amendment was
necessary to provide that power.'
If we agree that the privileges and immunities reach beyond
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, what then of Professor
Amar's suggestion of the differences between the Habeas Suspension Clause and the Capitation Clause? The linchpin of
Professor Amar's argument is the assumption that the source of
the right to the use of the writ of habeas corpus is Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2. But it is not self-evident that this is so.
Justice Bushrod Washington, for example, indicated that the
writ of habeas corpus was a "fundamental right" that belonged
to citizens of "all free governments" and identified it as one of
the privileges and immunities of federal citizens protected by
Article IV, Section 2.89 Using the interpretive method Professor
Amar has termed intratextualism," one notes that a significant difference exists between the text of the first eight amendments and Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
We know that the Framers of the Constitution thought that
the many provisions of the Bill of Rights were declaratory and
that, as suggested in the Ninth Amendment, the people retained many rights not mentioned in the Bill of Rights. There
are provisions in the first eight amendments suggesting their
declaratory nature. These include references to not "abridging"
certain First Amendment rights,9 to not "infringing" upon "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms" in the Second
Amendment,9 2 to not violating the "right of the people" to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures,9' and to "preserving" the right to civil juries.' At the same time, many of
the provisions of the amendments read very much like the
normal commands of new law:

88. See id. at 71-72.
89. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
90.
(1999).
91.
92.
93.
94.

See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747
See
See
See
See

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
id. amend. II.
id. amend. IV.
id. amend. VII.
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"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . ...""
"No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house ....
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Ju"97

ry

. . . .

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ....9 8
"Excessive bail shall not be required ....9
The provision of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 stands in
marked contrast to both the declaratory form and the positive
law formulation. It provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."'
If this Clause was intended to be declaratory of what Professor Amar terms a "personal right," it would read something
like: The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
abridged. If the Clause was intended to create or establish a
new right to habeas corpus it would use language approximating the following: "All citizens (or people) shall enjoy the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Article I, Section 9, Clause
2 does neither. 1 '
Instead, this provision tells the reader that there is such a
thing as the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." The text,

95. Id. amend. I.
96. Id. amend. III.
97. Id. amend. V.
98. Id. amend. VI.
99. Id. amend. VIII.
100. Id. art. I, § 9, cl.2.
101. Indeed, the only Amendment that seems analogous to Article I, Section 9,
Clause 2, is the Fourth Amendment. But that Amendment contains a less ambiguous
and more direct statement of a right: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . ." Id. amend. IV. The qualifying words, "unreasonable searches
and seizures," define the right itself. In contrast, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 seems
to have as its primary textual purpose a procedural goal: to spell out when the right
may be suspended.
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however, does not purport to create that right, shield it from
abridgement, or even declare its existence. Much like the
Griswold v. Connecticut"°2 view that marriage predates the
Constitution and exists independent of the Constitution,'0 3 one
has the feeling that somehow the right or privilege to exercise
the writ of habeas corpus does not stem from Article I, Section
9, but rather exists independent of that Article.
Ironically, one might turn the guns of refined incorporation
upon itself and ask: Is this a Clause creating or protecting an
individual right or is this a Clause relating to a procedural
matter, providing that the government could suspend this right
in certain instances?' °4 A close reading of the Clause suggests
it may be more of a structural or procedural aspect of government than an individual right. 5
If this is true, then the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause can hardly be said to "incorporate"
Article I, Section 9 in the way refined incorporation presupposes. To do so would incorporate not the right to habeas corpus,
but rather, only the procedure by which the writ of habeas
corpus could be suspended. This would be akin to attempting to
incorporate the Capitation Clause 6 or the federalism portion
of the Tenth Amendment."7
It does not necessarily follow that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is not included in the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause. It does suggest, however,
that the source of that "privilege" is not Article I, Section 9, but
some other source. Though the exact nature of that source is
beyond the scope of this paper, Senator Howard's Fourteenth
Amendment speech opens the possibility that the source of the

102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. See id. at 482, 486.
104. Indeed, the refined incorporation distinction may not be as easy to apply as
one might think. Consider Professor Amar's recurring example of a structural command, the Capitation Clause. That Clause provides: "No Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4. This may be a simple directive
to the government about the way in which it can assess a tax. But might it not also
be a right of a citizen to be taxed "proportionally" to other taxpayers?
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
106. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
107. Id. amend. X.
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right to habeas corpus is in Article IV, Section 2.108 The point
here, however, is one that undermines the foundation of refined
incorporation: The Fourteenth Amendment Founders do not
seem to have intended to "incorporate" the Suspension Clause
of Article I, Section 9.
It might be suggested that even if the comparison between
the Suspension Clause and the Capitation Clause did not inevitably lead to refined incorporation, the road to that conclusion
might lead through the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. °9 The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.""' The Tenth Amendment
provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.""'
While it is clear that reserving rights "to the people" could be
used to place limitations upon state action, how are we to treat
the Tenth Amendment's provision to "reserve power to the
States" if it is applied to the states?". Or, for that matter,
how do we link the first clause of the Ninth Amendment, "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,""' with the
clause reserving other rights to the people? Is the measuring

108. In a forthcoming article, C. Michael Walsh and I explore the constitutional
basis for the writ of habeas corpus. Like Professor Amar, we conclude that it was
intended by the Fourteenth Amendment Framers as one of the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens. We note, however, that the writ of habeas corpus was thought
to be one of the requirements of a republican form of government. Further, we note
that even conservative Democrats like Delaware's Willard Saulsbury thought that
writs of habeas corpus could be utilized to vindicate the liberty interests of people
held in bondage contrary to the commands of the Thirteenth Amendment. See CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1866); TEN BROEK, supra note 24, at 182 (1965).
Chief Justice Chase, on the Circuit, did precisely that in In re Turner, 24 F. Cas.
337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). The writ of habeas corpus was, of course, part of
the "rights of Englishmen" under the English Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2,
ch. 2 (Eng.), and the unwritten English constitution.
109. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 226.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
111. Id. amend. X
112. One option is that it protects the rights of local governments against state
governments, in the same way the Tenth Amendment protects state governments
against the federal government. There is a certain logical symmetry to that analysis,
but it seems to strain the text.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. IX
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stick of rights those reserved in the federal constitution or an
unmentioned state constitution, or both? This could be protection for "natural rights," but again, the reference to "the Constitution" makes this interpretation awkward as a matter of a textual construction.
Professor Amar suggests the term "Bill of Rights" as a short
hand for the first eight or ten amendments did not come into
common use until the 1860s." In none of the Bingham or
Howard speeches is there any reference to the Ninth or the
Tenth Amendment being enforced against the states. Indeed, in
his 1871 retrospective on the drafting of the Amendment,
Bingham explained that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens
of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to
the Constitution of the United States.""5 Earlier that same
year, Bingham authored a majority report rejecting the claim
that the voting was among the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities. In that report, he wrote that prior judicial
decisions had determined that "the first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power of
the States" and that such a determination made it necessary to
give Congress explicit power to enforce privileges and immunities of citizens in the Fourteenth Amendment."6
The statements by Bingham and Howard are confirmed by
some contemporary sources. For example, two of the three treatise writers, Judge Farrar and Dean Pomeroy, referred the
Fourteenth Amendment as enforcing the first eight amendments
to the Constitution against the states." Similarly, in United
States v. Hall,"8 Judge Woods made it clear that the Four-

114. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 284-88.
115. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (emphasis added).
116. H.R. REP. NO. 22 (1871), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS'
DEBATES, supra note 33, at 466-67.
117. See supra note 67. The third, Justice Paschal, suggested that it would enforce
all of the prior thirteen amendments. He did not explain how this would apply to the
Ninth or Tenth Amendments.
118. 26 F. Cas. 79 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). For an account of Justice Joseph
Bradley's correspondence giving Judge Woods advice on how to proceed on the legal
issues, see John P. Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
103, 108-09 (1963). See also Aynes, supra note 32, at 98 n.261 (discussing the dispute
as to whether a second case was decided on these same grounds by the same court).
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teenth Amendment was designed to enforce "the first eight articles of amendment." 119
If the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were considered part of
the Bill of Rights and thought to be enforceable against the
States, they would provide powerful support for refined incorporation. The reservation of undesignated rights "to the people"
might be incorporated against the states and the nonpersonal
rights and structural provisions could be excluded from incorporation. One could argue that the Framers were prescient in
utilizing refined incorporation themselves.12 After all, they
omitted the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Amendments
from their definition of the Bill of Rights and, as a consequence, from their partial definition of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Like the Suspension Clause, however, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments provide their own arguments against refined incorporation. After all, many theories of antislavery advocates
and abolitionists were based upon natural rights and natural
law theories that could be viewed as being recognized through
the Reservation of Rights Clauses of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.''
Similarly, many Fourteenth Amendment
Framers relied on theories highly congenial with use of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.'22 This being the case, if the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers had intended to apply the
concept now referred to as refined incorporation, they could
have done so by including the reservation of rights provisions of
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Their failure to do so suggests some other factor than refined incorporation was at
12
work. s

119. Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 82.
120. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 226.
121. See TEN BROEK, supra note 24.
122. See Olsen, supra note 57.
123. Arguably, the vicinage provision of the Sixth Amendment could support refined incorporation. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 275. That portion of the Amendment
provides that in all criminal prosecutions "the accused shall have the right" to be
tried "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously been ascertained by law." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
At the most general level, this provision simply implements the universal
American rule that a criminal proceeding must be brought in the state that has jurisdiction to prosecute the crime and in a venue based, not on the will of a local prose-
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Understanding the source of the right of habeas corpus as
coming from somewhere other than Article I, Section 9, Clause
2, removes the linchpin from theory of refined incorporation.
That loss is confirmed by the knowledge that the
Reconstructors did not intend to incorporate the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments and by a recognition that the vicinage provision simply restates the jurisdictional and procedural due
process requirements of the existing state law. Thus, it would
appear that as promising as the refined incorporation theory
may be, one can properly invoke the Scottish verdict of "not
proven."
III. THE

EFFECT OF REFINED INCORPORATION

But what if one did find support for "refined" incorporation?
In what way would our jurisprudence change? It would not
exclude any right already recognized under selective incorporation. Adding to the growing literature about the meaning of the
Second Amendment," Professor Amar links and contrasts the
views of the Framers on the right to bear arms, writing of the
Concord Militiaman and the Carolina freedman.' 25 He shows
eloquently how the meaning of the Amendment may have been
transformed in the Fourteenth Amendment adoption process.
cutor, but upon a statute or rule in effect prior to the alleged crime. Applying it to
the states might be redundant, but would work no significant doctrinal change.
Professor Amar posits difficulties if a crime were committed against a state
while the perpetrator was in a U.S. territory or on the high seas but provides no
examples. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 275. As a general proposition, however, one
would suppose that in order for a state to have jurisdiction over the trial of an alleged crime, at least one portion of the alleged crime must have been committed
within that state. The in-state portion of the crime would determine both jurisdiction
and venue for purposes of the vicinage clause.
Congressman Bingham, of course, quoted all of the Sixth Amendment as being
enforceable against the states in his 1871 speech on the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 84 (1871). Senator Howard,
indicating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
included rights "such as" those he identified from the first eight amendments, did not
quote any of the amendments and paraphrased only selected portions of them. However, it may be worthy of note that Howard included the "right to be tried by an
impartial jury of the vicinage" in his list of examples. See Howard, supra note 39.
124. See, e.g., Robert Cottrol & Ray Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309 (1991); Sanford Levinson, The
EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236 (1994).
125. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 266.
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He would go beyond current selective incorporation jurisprudence and incorporate the Second Amendment. If the current
literature is credited, however, then one would reach the same
result under either selective or total incorporation. 126 On the
other hand, if the Supreme Court views the Second Amendment
as a matter of federalism, protecting the right of the state to
maintain a militia, then refined incorporation works no change.
While suggesting that the Reconstructors did not have the
same Third Amendment concerns as the revolutionary Framers,
Amar concludes that the "privatizing" of the Third Amendment
links it to a privacy right that should be enforced against the
states.'27 This too could be accomplished under selective or total incorporation.
While reflecting upon the Founders emphasis upon citizen's
rights to "participate" in juries and the Reconstructors' emphasis upon the right to be "tried" by juries, Amar's refined incorporation guarantees the right to jury trial in criminal cases
under the Sixth Amendment. 1" Again, this is a result that
would be reached under selective or total incorporation.
The first real break with total incorporation comes with the
Seventh Amendment. Even though there is clear evidence from
the debates that Bingham thought the Seventh Amendment
was to be enforced against the states, Professor Amar's use of
"refined" incorporation suggests a possible justification for nonincorporation.'29 Under Amar's skillful hand, however, refined
incorporation determines that the remaining provisions of the
Fifth through Eighth Amendments "are rather easy candidates
for incorporation."' He specially enumerates "double jeopardy

126. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
127. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 267.
128. Professor Amar rejects the vicinage provision as unworkable in certain situations: "mechanical incorporation of this federalism clause against [the] states would
make little sense." Id. at 275. But see analysis supra note 123. Professor Amar also
believes that even in applying the clause to federal cases "this rule [does] not quite
mean what it said." AmAR, supra note 1, at 275. If that be true in the federal context, then why is it not also true when enforced against the state? Could one not
apply total incorporation and simply take into account all of the hypothetical circumstances Amar posits?
129. See id. at 276.
130. Id. at 278.
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and compelled self-incrimination, as well as the rights of confrontation, compulsory process, counsel, bail, and the like." 3 '
In the end, the results of refined incorporation are largely
congruent with the results of Justice Brennan's selective incorporation. Justification is found for not incorporating the Seventh Amendment.
A different result is posited for the Second Amendment, but
only because Professor Amar views it as an "individual" rather
than a "collective right."'32 It is only in the area of Fifth
Amendment grand jury rights that refined incorporation produces any significantly different result from selective incorporation. 3' This is so because Professor Amar .concludes that, "in
general, courts today have ended up in pretty much the right
place, even if they have not always offered the best textual and
historical reasons .... Selective incorporation is largely right in
result and instinct .... 13
IV.

CONCLUSION

Professor Amar thinks in large concepts and embraces the
"big idea" of the Constitution. He writes elegantly of the intentions of the original Framers of the Bill of Rights. He makes
both intriguing and important connections and contrasts between their thinking and that of the Fourteenth Amendment
Framers. He does so by a synthesis that draws upon the insights of previously competing theories, using Frankfurter as
well as Black, Crosskey as well as Fairman. He correctly challenges us to think about new ways to look at what has been
called the "incorporation" debate and raises new questions that
bear further investigation.
Notwithstanding my reservations about the application of
refined incorporation, I have no reservations in praising the
quality of his work or its pioneering status. For the last fifteen
years, no thorough and careful scholar could write upon the
incorporation controversy without first consulting Michael Kent
131. Id.
132. See id. at 259.
133. See id. at 307.

134. Id.
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Curtis's No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights35 and Raoul Berger's Government by
Judiciary.36 To that list, one must now add Aldil Reed
Amar's The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction.
Professor Amar ends his narrative with "more work always
remains to be done, if all are to be free and equal." 3 1 In doing that work, contemporary and future scholars will build
upon the foundation laid by Professor Amar in The Bill of
Rights.

135. CURTIS, supra note 37.
136. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
137. AMAR, supra note 1, at 294.

